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Abstract 
This article explores the connections between migration and foreign combat, offering an 
improved definition of „foreign fighters,” and a general concept of foreign combatants’ 
behaviour as an anomalous form of migration. In contrast with the popular discourse and 
terrorism-related concerns about present-day Western European foreign fighters in Iraq 
and Syria (and their return to Europe) and Middle Eastern migrant refugees (and their 
arrival in Europe), the intention of this article is to offer a conceptually thorough 
consideration of the causal connections between movements of migration and the 
presence of foreign combatants in armed conflict, informed by a wide sample of cases. 
Such an assessment has to take place with a view to all forms of migration (including 
forced migration), all forms of foreign combat (not only foreign combat on the side of 
non-state actors as David Malet's oft-cited but overly restrictive definition would imply), 
and regions of the world beyond the Middle East and Islamic countries. Along these 
guiding lines, the article points out many comparatively rarely considered cases of foreign 
combat as well as the underestimated obstacles in the way of fighting abroad. Taking 
account of the latter allows refutation of a key implication of „new war theory” (its focus 
on „greed” as a motive of combatants), in light of the continued importance of cultural 
factors and ideological motives for participation in foreign combat. 
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Basic considerations related to migration 
Even though only a fraction of humanity participates in protracted voluntary migration 
(as opposed to brief visits to other countries), mobility is fundamental to human nature 
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and has been a key driver of history. This is how human beings came to inhabit all 
continents in the first place. The more recent history of colonisation, economic 
development, and even that of wars cannot be told without reference to movements of 
migration. 
 Here only a few basic considerations are pointed out that shall inform the 
discussion that follows (based on Koser, 2007). These are (1) that migrants tend to move 
to places with pre-existing migrant presence of the same or a similar population (Koser, 
2007: 36); (2) that as a result of their movements networks of migration spring up 
providing an infrastructure (the provision of information, financial resources and 
logistical facilitation) for continued migratory flows along the same channel (Koser, 
2007: 37); (3) that a part of movements of migration is „circular” in nature, i.e. migrants 
may continue to move between the original source and receiving countries (Koser, 2007: 
9, 51); (4) that migrants’ motives for migration are typically complex, and they may fit 
various different conceptual and legal categories of migrants as well as change from a 
profile fitting one of these to one conforming to another (Koser, 2007: 18); (5) that the 
distinction between source, receiving and transit countries is becoming blurred as the 
super-network of migration becomes more and more an all-channel network;2 and (6) that 
even so there are a few countries with a pure „source” character where collapsing 
governance and armed conflict renders flight vital and immigration implausible (and, in 
that sense, anomalous when it does happen). 
 
Foreign fighters: a definition 
Most foreign fighters are migrants in the sense that they live „outside their own country 
for a year or more” (Koser, 2007: 16), or at the least for a considerable amount of time. 
They are a very special subset of migrants, however, and the implications of their status 
as such need to be considered in detail.  
Foreign fighters have been around, and involved in armed conflicts, for much 
longer than is generally considered. Misconceptions of their presence as a recent 
phenomenon derive from definitions that primarily reflect the few salient cases of 
contemporary conflict where foreign fighters have played a prominent role (mostly 
Middle Eastern conflicts with Muslim foreign fighters). 
                                                          
2 An all-channel network is one in which every node connects to all other nodes, unlike, for example, in a 
scale-free network where most nodes connect to a select few „popular” nodes (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001: 
1; Barabási, 2013). 
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A common definition thus tells us that foreign fighters are „noncitizens of conflict 
states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts” (Malet, 2013: 9). This takes a number 
of things for granted that ought to be critically assessed. 
Do the combatants of interest need to join specifically an insurgency to qualify as 
„foreign fighters?” Is that circumstance relevant to their being „fighters,” and to their 
being „foreign?” Malet’s definition is just as puzzling from a truly neutral analytical 
perspective as the tendency in terrorism research to define terrorism as „non-state actor 
violence.” Just as states can in fact engage in the use and the support of „terrorism” 
(violence deliberately targeted against civilians, designed to impact on a secondary 
audience of observers) to further their ends, states can also welcome foreign fighters on 
their side, and may even incorporate them into their armed forces. The French Foreign 
Legion, the British Gurkhas, the International Brigades on the republican side in the 
Spanish civil war, the Polish soldiers who fought in the course of the Italian campaign or 
in Operation Market Garden during World War II, and even immigrants participating in 
naturalisation-through-military-service schemes3 may all serve as examples featuring 
foreign fighters involved in warfare (Porch, 2010; Farwell, 1990; Chudzio and Hejczyk, 
2015; Koskodan, 2011). 
A definition focusing only on non-state combat may also lose sight of the frequent 
involvement of state parties behind non-state belligerents who serve as their proxy forces. 
Foreign fighters who join an insurgency or a given combatant party may be delegated to 
do so by a state party, at times from among members of its own regular armed forces as 
seems to have been the case on a number of occasions with Pakistani soldiers fighting on 
the side of the Afghan mujahedeen (see the example of „Colonel Imam” in e.g. Gall, 
2010) and later the Taliban (see available evidence about direct Pakistani support to the 
latter before the 2001 intervention in Human Rights Watch, 2001). 
Furthermore, the „noncitizen” criterion takes the existence of citizenship, and by 
implication modern nation-states, for granted. This arbitrarily narrows the time-frame of 
interest whereas in reality „foreignness” is a quality that predates the nation-state. One 
may be foreign to a given locale without having a different citizenship, and historically 
one may have been foreign to a given locale without having any kind of citizenship to 
                                                          
3 For instance in the United States where the Immigration and Nationality Act offers this possibility to 
people „who (1) have good moral character, (2) knowledge of the English language, (3) knowledge of U.S. 
government and history (civics), and (4) attachment to the United States by taking an Oath of Allegiance 
to the U.S. Constitution.” See further information at https://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/naturalization-
through-military-service-fact-sheet (accessed: 12 January 2016). 
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differentiate one from the locals resident in the area. Crusaders covered a great distance 
to join the struggle in what they regarded as the „Holy Land” (Hindley, 2004) just as the 
jihadis of today travel a great distance in many cases to help out those whom they see as 
their „brothers.” 
At the same time, „local” is in empirical reality a problematic category. Does 
being resident, and thus local, in one village qualify one as foreign in the case of fighting 
in or around the neighbouring village? The application of the term „local” in the context 
of most conflicts is implicit reasoning concerning the legitimacy of involvement in a 
given struggle in a given locale. It alludes to who belongs in that locale in the first place.4 
The Kamajor militia that played a role in Sierra Leone’s stabilisation post-1995 may have 
been a „local force” in the eyes of the international community but, as its Mende name 
makes it clear, it was a force arising from the Mende-speaking southeast and was thus 
behaving and seen differently in other parts of the country (Ferme and Hoffman, 2004). 
Combat on the side of others may be understood by the supposedly non-local 
combatants as „their struggle” and „their community’s struggle” regardless, their notion 
of communal identity and territorial possession extending to the people and the area 
concerned. In some cases this may be an artificially or intersubjectively constructed 
„right” to impose an agenda unto others, irrespective of whether the others concerned are 
willing or not to accept said agenda. Calling a fighter a foreign fighter may itself be a tool 
to counter this: for the purpose of separating these combatants from the people among 
whom they are involved in fighting (to de-legitimise such combatants). 
To use a contemporary example of the controversial (and inherently political) 
nature of the „foreign” label, those sharing the Islamic State’s perspective in Iraq and 
Syria may not regard members of the broad Islamic umma (community) as „foreign” at 
all. Such a distinction may be illegitimate in their eyes in light of the „unity of the 
community of the believers” which they seek to emphasise. At the same time, showing 
the complexity of the matter at hand, even Islamic State combatants indicate attachment 
to different locales in their „kunyas,” i.e. their noms de guerre: there are the „al-Libis” 
(Libyans), the „al-Masris” (Egyptians), the „al-Suris” (Syrians), the „al-Filastinis” 
(Palestinians), the „al-Shishanis” (Chechnyans); by today there are also the „al-Britani” 
                                                          
4 This may be one of the reasons for the tendency in the literature to accept the understanding that foreign 
fighting is connected to joining an insurgency. Joining the state may be seen by some to be somehow more 
normal and legitimate, In other words this is a manifestation of statism: the tendency to naturalise the state 
as a gatekeeper to both territory and society. 
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(British), the „al-Alemani” (Germans), the „al-Beljiki” (Belgians), the „al-Faransi” 
(Frenchmen), etc.  
With a view to the above complications, a foreign fighter may be regarded as a 
combatant who takes part in combat within the territory of a political entity or sub-entity 
other than the one to which he or she has substantial attachment through birth, personal 
relationships, basic socialisation, and the amount of (life)time spent there, with the 
additional requirement that the combatant in question be not involved in combat as a 
member of the armed forces of his or her home entity. 
The three definitional elements highlighted above (underlined and in italics, 
respectively) are reviewed below, along with other issues, to clarify and consider further 
details that may be relevant to careful conceptualisation. 
 
1. The requirement of not being part of one’s „own entity’s” armed forces may 
be necessary as members of such forces typically have the nationality of the 
country they are fighting for. The definition thus excludes regular and other 
military troops involved in overtly fighting an adversary in depth, within the 
other party’s own territory (e.g. Soviet troops advancing on Berlin in 1945, 
or Russian troops capturing the town of Gori during the war with Georgia in 
2008), or fighting far away from their home country (e.g. Napoléon’s Grande 
Armée and its fellow travellers occupying Moscow in 1812, or the Russian 
air force bombing targets in Syria from September 2015). 
Technological developments in warfare introduced ever larger mobility 
and firepower to the battlespace, and this played an important role in 
compelling leading powers’ armed forces to become globally deployable and 
dispersed even in peacetime.5 Economic and political interconnectedness 
worked to the same effect, along with the pull of economic interests. 
In the globalised political context and highly transnational social world of 
today military forces may have numerous reasons to remain engaged in 
different tasks around the world, be it as peacekeepers (in Peace-Keeping 
Forces or PKFs from the Sinai Peninsula to Kosovo), as observers (from the 
                                                          
5 With reference to the need for power projection and rapid response capability related to developments 
even in peripheric areas, 2nd strike capability in prospective nuclear warfare (by submarines and 
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles), security reassurance to allies fearing attack, and the evolving 
capability of intercontinental warfare (to name a few of the specific reasons that explain this). 
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Golan Heights to Jammu and Kashmir) or as forces forward-deployed with a 
view to contingencies (such as the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet which has its 
„Garrison/HQ” in Bahrein). This is relevant because it would be wrong to 
deny that members of military forces serving abroad actually constitute a 
special subset of legal migrant labourers.6 
2. The word „home” in „home entity” in the above definition acknowledges the 
elusive or intersubjective nature of what makes a foreign fighter „foreign:” 
through the question of whether a combatant has a larger political entity or 
sub-entity to call „home” other than the one where he or she is fighting. In 
some cases this is not a simple question. Most of Israel’s overseas recruits in 
the First Arab-Israeli War emerged from among the „overseas enlistees” 
(Ga’hal) who joined its armed forces in Palestine from among the ranks of 
the Jewish population in Displaced Persons camps around Europe, in the 
wake of World War II. The Allied Powers originally intended to re-settle 
these people „in their respective countries” – countries that in many cases 
proved less than accomodating towards them and to which they did not 
necessarily wish to return. Instead, many of them were looking to Palestine 
as their future home, and many were persuaded to accept that prospect in the 
years that ensued [even as others re-settled elsewhere] (Cohen, 2011; 
Yablonka, 1992; Zertal, 1998). 
Another peculiar example in this respect is the case of Poles who were 
forcibly removed from Polish areas by Soviet forces after the Soviet 
aggression against Poland in 1939, and eventually set up the Polish Army in 
the USSR (upon Nazi Germany’s attack against the Soviet Union). This exile 
army, created to serve at the side of Soviet forces, evacuated eventually to 
Iran, and merged in the Middle East with other elements into the 2nd Polish 
Corps (Chudzio and Hejczyk, 2015: 17-20). 
                                                          
6 The term „entity” is used instead of „state,” and this is relevant with a view to the times before the rise of 
the modern state. To operationalise how the distinction may apply (rather problematically) in a given case, 
French crusaders, for example, would have qualified as foreign combatants on the basis of fighting not for 
the French Kingdom per se, in lands distant from home, doing so in a force of diverse composition – a force 
that was often quite disorganised as well. They were, at the same time, acting under the Pope’s guidance 
(albeit behaving not always in accordance with it, in practice), and may have joined a crusade and fought 
in it in direct service of their feudal lord – all of which makes categorisation in their case problematic. (On 
the organisation, including recruitment, of the first crusades, see Lloyd, 1999b: 47-53.) Swiss pikemen or 
German Landsknechte from Swabia (Schwaben) in foreign service would be purer examples from medieval 
times.  
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3. The reference to „combatant” is interesting in and of itself. The conduct of 
war is per definition a life and death matter. How a combatant who may have 
other, „nearer” enemies, ends up in potentially lethal engagement with a 
fighting force in a different locale, and why he or she does so, is always an 
intriguing issue to investigate. 
It is a common idea to think of the people concerned as either mercenaries 
(people who are financially motivated), or fanatics (people who are, at the 
very least, strongly committed to an idea), or somehow the ethnic kin of the 
local combatants (and thus motivated by solidarity, in which case they are not 
as clearly „foreign” as in other cases). In reality, however, these three 
categories may be found to be in overlap in some cases, while in others neither 
of them may constitute a valid interpretation (Morillo, 2008: 260). For 
instance, adventure-seeking, or the „Hemingway factor,”7 which is usually 
found to play some role for a part of recruits in any case, seems to play an 
important role in the case of Western volunteers joining Kurdish forces and 
Christian militias in Iraq and Syria (Patin - bell¿ngcat, 2015: 26-29). 
Additionally, a motive is usually not enough of its own, and opportunities as 
well as constraints play a role in how and why people become foreign fighters.  
Opportunity, for example, would often arise from the presence of an actor 
or actors interested in mobilising for participation and hence the process of 
mobilisation itself is also interesting when seeking to understand what drives 
involvement in foreign combat. Consider here the peculiar example of 
Afghans fighting in Syria on the side of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government 
forces, recruited by Iranian agents from among Afghan migrants and refugees 
in Iran (Dehghan, 2015). 
4. The type of combat role also pertains to understanding the process of taking 
part in foreign combat. A person volunteering to be a suicide bomber may be 
interested in a one-nanosecond participation in conflict, with the limited 
requirements thereof (as were e.g. British Muslims Asif Muhammad Hanif 
and Omar Khan Sharif when they blew themselves up at a Tel-Aviv bar in 
                                                          
7 American writer Ernest Hemingway covered various conflicts as a journalist, including the Spanish Civil 
War from where he reported clearly favouring the Republican side. He took his part in the making of 
propaganda films in support of Republican forces and he spoke out on various fora against Franco’s faction 
and Fascism in general. Yet, he was not a foreign fighter (a combatant) himself. On Hemingway’s time in 
Spain during the civil war see Herlihy-Mera (2012). 
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April 2003). Very different skills may be required for someone to make a 
valuable contribution in manufacturing suicide vests for bombers, and the 
recruitment process cannot quite work the same way. Herein lies a 
definitional issue: in order to decide what constitutes a „combat role,” one has 
to have a solid concept of how to distinguish foreign fighters from foreigners 
who may be closely in touch with them, in the same area together with them, 
and yet not actively taking part in the fighting alongside them. What 
constitutes „taking part” is problematic. 
 The manufacturing of suicide vests clearly does, even though the person 
involved in this does not normally see direct engagement with the forces 
targeted; such persons’ role will be analogous in this respect to that of a 
worker in a factory producing weapons of any kind. It may be tempting to say 
that a person’s or his or her environment’s understanding of one’s role should 
determine the answer to the question above, yet even so one encounters many 
problematic issues. In Israel, people who, at the time of the birth of the 
country, smuggled Jewish migrants to Palestine on board ships, or flew 
military aircraft to the country without staying there to fight themselves, are 
acknowledged in historical memory as „overseas volunteers” (Ma’hal) of the 
1948 war nonetheless. 
To consider a very different example: If a teenage Muslim girl living in a 
Western country decides to join the Islamic State and marry one of its warriors 
to thus, in her own understanding, contribute to the cause of jihad, should that 
be seen as being part of the jihad? [Consider the example of „Syona, 21,” born 
to Dutch parents, in: San, 2015: 50.] How about the cook who prepares food 
for jihadi combatants? [Consider the example of Osama bin Laden’s cook e.g. 
on the basis of AP, 2012.] 
With reference to humanitarian law, combatants are those who directly 
take part in hostilities. Yet from case to case such a restrictive understanding 
of the notion of the combatant may have to be reconsidered. 
 
Links between conflict-induced migration and foreign combat 
Conflict may induce both displacement and ex-migration (crossing borders). With regards 
to the presence of foreign combatants, it may induce immigration as well. The latter is 
clearly the more counter-intuitive implication of conflict, from the perspective of a 
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Rational Actor Model interpretation of human behaviour that regards survival as the 
fundamental preference of human beings in a consistent and transitive order of 
preferences. Yet, for various reasons, people do sometimes seek the chance to join 
conflicts of choice nonetheless. 
That conflict induces displacement is a fairly uncontroversial statement. Still, it is 
worth taking account of the type of conflict, as suggested by Sarah Kenyon Lischer (2007: 
146) who cites Kalyvas’ categorisation of the latter (in Kalyvas, 2006) whilst arguing that 
in terms of displacement effects different kinds of conflict produce different outcomes. 
Genocidal intent thus makes a difference in cases of both unilateral and bi- or 
multilateral use of violence. When state terror or civil war violence is selective (directed 
at select members of the opposition in the case of the former, and only combatants in the 
case of the latter), less displacement may be expected. Naturally, as noted by Lischer as 
well, recognising this is only the beginning to arriving at better-functioning models of 
conflict-induced displacement. In the case of a civil war, the weapons and tactics 
employed, the strategies of the combatants, and the spatio-territorial dynamics of the 
fighting may all contribute to different results.8 Moreover, a protracted civil war may 
create a host of economic incentives for leaving as well as the fear of being enlisted by 
the combatant parties, thus leading to flight for reasons other than the fear of imminent 
death and destruction. 
Much available anecdotal evidence supports the notion that conflict zones are fled 
not because all of their territory becomes a sure place to die but because much of their 
territory becomes a bad place to live. Consider but two examples here. Faisal Uday Faisal, 
an Iraqi man from Baghdad speaks openly of having migrated to Germany for economic 
reasons (having had a low-paying job as a steward in the Iraqi Ministry of Education) and 
„arranging” a story of being threatened by Iraqi militias to be able to claim refugee status, 
having by now returned to Iraq (cited in Morris, 2016). Meanwhile, a Syrian mother 
speaking in a PBS documentary at a bazaar in Damascus (2015: 7’29’’ to 8’05’’) tells 
about her sons, one of whom was „martryred” in her words, fighting in the ranks of the 
Syrian Army, while the others have left for abroad. As to the latter, she states that they 
should also have been „martyred” if necessary. In both cases the motives for leaving 
                                                          
8 Consider the case of Syria where tactics that may qualify as terrorism, or at the least as the indiscriminate 
use of military force, are regularly employed by various factions against civilian populations. It would be 
hard to disregard the effects of such incidents when at the same time a single, stand-alone terrorist attack 
in a Western European country typically evokes significant reactions as well. 
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country and relatives behind were complex in the case of those who did so, and the word 
„flight” does not do justice to such complexity. 
 Once developments exceed internal displacement, and the people affected cross 
international borders, the countries primarily implicated by this are the directly 
neighbouring ones that become the countries of first asylum. The refugee population is 
mostly contained in their terroritory in the short run. Later on, however, ex-migration 
continues as temporary housing in refugee camps and other similar contingency facilities 
does not provide adequate prospects to the people concerned. Diaspora groups thus 
usually emerge out of protracted conflict situations. 
The permanently transient nature of life in conflict-induced dispersion in diaspora 
on the one hand, and in refugee communities in countries of first asylum on the other, 
may be such that joining combat remains an option for young people, especially men. The 
emergence of „quasi-foreign” fighters is thus often observable. Diaspora Somalis’ 
fighting in Somalia (see e.g. ADL, 2013) or the example of diaspora Chechens in Ukraine 
may illustrate this (in the latter case on a substitution battlefield instead of Chechnya 
proper; see Kramer, 2015). In the meantime, refugees in countries neighbouring on 
conflict zones are often forcibly or semi-forcibly recruited to be combatants (Stedman 
and Tanner, 2003). If they then fight in their source countries (from where they left as 
refugees) they may also be denoted as „quasi-foreign fighters” themselves. 
 As to those who migrate to conflict not from the diaspora and not as a result of 
coercion but feeling that there is a likeness of cause between them and the local 
combatants in their conflict of choice, the following list of considerations may apply 
based on a review of the available literature on foreign fighters (and related subjects): 
 
(1) that push as well as pull factors play a role in driving the movement of aspiring 
combatants, just as in the case of other movements of migration; 
(2) that there may be among them some who join fellow combatants, i.e. those 
significant others who may fit the previously mentioned profile more clearly, 
out of peer or social pressure – their micro-environment may be key to driving 
their actions. Cluster migration is often visible in foreign fighting as well as 
in the case of regular migration (on the importance of collective choices see 
della Porta, 1995; Petersen, 2001); 
(3) that language skills play an important role in structuring the dynamics of the 
migration of prospective and actual combatants. Without commonality of 
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language or the availability of a convenient lingua franca, foreign fighting 
may be far less appealing (Ciluffo et al., 2010: 21-22); 
(4) that the movement may have certain key „bridge” and „rockstar” figures who 
play a critical role in its organisation (Ciluffo et al., 2010: 21-22); 
(5) that foreign combatants may be looking for a substitute fight in the conflict 
they join and see it as a prequel to eventually continuing essentially the same 
fight at home (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 93-93); 
(6) that given the transnational nature of the mobilisation as well as the migration 
for combat, pre-existing transnational human networks and resource bases 
may play a role in breathing life into the movement of combatants (Adamson, 
2005: 31-35); 
(7) that there may develop conflict between foreign and local combatants for a 
number of reasons. 
 
Strategic explanations of the foreign fighter phenomenon concentrate on 
understanding combatants’ behaviour in terms of a rational actor model, and thus focus 
on the role of constraints and opportunities. Push and pull factors in this sense are diverse. 
For example: in the People’s Crusade of 1096 an important driving factor seems to have 
been economic distress and famine resulting in general scarcities, and even in mass 
outbreaks of ergotism (upon the consumption of stored rye poisoned by the toxin of a 
fungus). As to the latter, the sudden spike in cases of ergot poisoning had some relevance 
as well, as the fear that it inspired added to the wave of millenarianism sweeping across 
Christian Europe at the time (Riley-Smith, 2005: 18; Hindley, 2004: 21). 
Important questions from the perspective of the would-be combatants include 
whether in his or her home area a foreign fighter has left behind a combat-prohibitive 
environment, or if the hope on their part is that constraints in the home environment may 
be eventually overcome by first training, practicing and consequently becoming a better 
warrior elsewhere (Hegghammer, 2013: 6-7). 
While some of the considerations cited from the literature with respect to this are 
highly specific to the transnational jihadi movement (focused as the literature is on them), 
it seems reasonable to assume that in the past other foreign fighters may have found their 
respective environment combat-prohibitve in one sense or another as well, just as it may 
be reasonable to assume that many acquired military skills during their time as foreign 
fighters. For some this indeed may have been a key goal in and of itself, with a view to 
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further, more distant ends. Based on the scarce evidence available, Rękawek notes the 
possibility of this even in the case of the few Western European volunteers who have 
joined the Moscow-backed rebel side in the conflict in Ukraine (Rękawek, 2015a: 8-11, 
and 2015b). 
Given commonsensical considerations about how both the practicing of one’s 
existing skills in a new environment and the highly likely learning of new skills in a new 
environment may make one a more capable person in any walk of life, we may expect 
that this experience can be generalised to foreign fighters of any kind. What this does not 
mean is that foreign fighters would be necessarily more capable than local fighters. The 
experience of fighting in a foreign land is expected to enhance the skills they have and 
learn but the comparison in their being „comparatively more capable” is with their prior 
self. The exception may be that of mercenaries. In an historical overview of privatised 
warfare, Singer finds that „When quality mattered more than quantity, the activity and 
significance of mercenaries was typically higher, primarily because skilled professionals 
were superior to ill-trained or citizen soldiers” (2003: 18). The role of the former South 
African firm Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone may be an instructive example in this 
regard (Howe, 1998). 
Once foreign combatants are present in the area of conflict, their relationship to 
the local combatants to whom they are allied may become strained. Tension may be the 
result of the inevitably awkward relationship between partly or fully autonomous (and 
armed) actors who have potentially incompatible interests – and foreign combatants often 
fight in units of their own, even when hierarchically incorporated into a larger local force, 
owing to the practicality of this arising from their difference of language. Beyond this, 
foreign fighters may distort the agenda of local combatants’ struggle, or even hijack it 
outright. They may act in less than perfect agreement with local combatants, e.g. by 
giving up early or continuing fighting when a compromise may be reached. In other 
words, they may be fighting with a different understanding of the public good (and with 
reference to a different „public” at that). In fact, it is hard to imagine how foreign and 
local combatants may have the exact same public good in mind related to what they are 
involved in (Hegghammer makes a similar point in 2010: 63). When foreign fighters 
enjoy a degree of autonomy and are, at the same time, more extreme in their approach to 
the conflict and towards the opposing parties, this may result in excessive violence and, 
consequently, more in the way of conflict-induced displacement and ex-migration. 
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As to the post-conflict experience of foreign fighters, van Zuijdewijn convincingly 
argues that instead of, or besides, the motive to become a foreign fighter, one’s motive 
upon returning, in some cases decided in advance, in some cases developed at a later 
stage, may be an equally relevant dimension of categorisation. Thus, writing of jihadi 
foreign warriors, she differentiates „terrorists,” „martyrs,” „veterans,” „reintegrated 
fighters,” and „recruiters” (Zuijdewijn, 2014: 81-84). 
Martyrs are those who are killed in the course of their tour as foreign fighters and 
may have been interested in sacrificing themselves in this way (and in never coming back) 
in the first place. Veterans are those who may continue to wander from one theatre of 
fighting to the other, adopting this as a form of life. Reintegrated fighters are those who 
eventually move beyond the fighting experience and choose to return to a more normal 
life. Recruiters, finally, may be back in their old country but with the interest of organising 
the continued supply of foreign combatants to a given conflict – they may do so especially 
effectively as veterans of the fight themselves. 
One should add that the path that a foreign fighter eventually takes is determined 
partly by constraints, in any case, and hence one’s motive (or intentions) upon returning 
may be different from one’s eventual record upon returning. More importantly, a category 
that is missing from van Zuijdewijn’s list, very relevantly for the subject consideered in 
this article, is the „émigré” who never returns, finding a new home connected to foreign 
fighting either in or near the conflict zone proper or elsewhere. The émigré may be either 
an exile who is practically unable to return, or a voluntary migrant whose wish may have 
been to emigrate in the first place. 
Precisely this is the basis of one of the most interesting connections between 
migration and foreign fighting: that it has played a role in the process of state formation, 
with prominent examples across history including the Crusader states of the 12th and 13th 
centuries, the Monastic State of the Teutonic Knights (1230-1525), as well as, in the 
course of the 18th and 19th centuries, the history of the United States9 where foreign 
                                                          
9 Many newcomers to the Americas as well as actual foreign combatants (who would eventually return to 
their home countries) served in the U.S. War of Independence, on both sides. On the side of the colonies 
fought people such as Gilbert du Motier (the Marquis of Lafayette) who returned to France after the conflict, 
or, for another example, Michael Kovats (Kováts Mihály), formerly a Hussar officer of Maria Theresa, born 
in Karcag, Hungary, who joined the cavalry of the Continental Army and died in the 1779 Siege of 
Charleston. His comrade Casimir Pulaski (Kazimierz Pułaski) shared in his fate several months later, during 
the siege of Savannah. Together they are remembered to this day as the founders of U.S. cavalry. In the 
meantime, on the other side served a great number of „Hessians” from Hessen-Kassel whose rulers for 
centuries specialised in „hiring out” some of their soldiers as mercenary troops – a source of significant 
revenues for the Landgraviate (Reese, 1992: 16). 
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volunteers were as crucial in acquiring lands that today are a part of Texas [and were for 
a brief while a part of the Republic of Texas] (Malet, 2013: 58-92) as the continued influx 
of migrants was in pushing the Frontier westward along with the native population. These 
are but some of the more visible cases.10  
 
The transnationality of foreign fighting and its limits 
The theory of transnational mobilisation originates from starting assumptions that include 
the ambiguous nature of who may be regarded as socially embedded when it is an 
increasingly global world of transnational human networks in which individuals are 
connected. There is, in latter decades, growing migration as well as intensifying capital 
mobility. In such a context, „social entrepreneurs” interested in mobilising for different 
causes may draw on „transnational constituencies” and „transnational resource bases,” 
that may emerge out of financial flows of remittances for example, and from 
„transnational informal economic networks” of labour, be it labour employed in licit or 
illicit economic activity [such as organised crime] (Adamson, 2005: 31-35). 
In migrant communities, densely networked cooperation is especially common as 
they struggle to collectively overcome the problems of adaptation in a new environment 
where a steady stream of newcomers may be joining those already there. This gives rise 
to the solidarity networks of imagined communities, actually bringing the community 
closer together at the same time as it maintains an intense connection to those left behind 
at home as well (Lloyd, 1999a: 371-373). Along with the migration of people and capital, 
ideas spread more easily in a context like this, and this further facilitates transnational 
mobilisation (Adamson, 2005: 33-37). 
Historically, the level of transnationalisation in the three dimensions alluded to 
above (of people, capital, and ideas) is variable and there have been earlier eras 
characterised by population movements as significant as the ones witnessed today. The 
simultaneously increasing flow of persons, goods, services, capital and ideas may 
represent something qualitatively new but the above insights into transnational 
mobilisation may still be of use in studying earlier historical contexts as well.11  
                                                          
10 For a case considered less often, take the brief history of the State of Katanga, a short-lived breakaway 
entity (1960-1963) in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, under President Moise 
Tshombe’s leadership, whose armed strength derived largely from the presence of foreign mercenary forces 
(organised in the framework of the infamous Katanga Gendarmerie). 
11 Taking part in the crusades, for instance, used to be referred to in their time as „peregrinatio” (pilgrimage) 
as well as „iter” (journey) and „passagium generale” (general passage), containing reference to how the 
experience was connected to the long-established practice of pilgrimage to Jerusalem. It had its 
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Regarding the issue of how much overall continuity there is, reflecting on the 
seeming prominence of foreign fighters in the contemporary era, we should question to 
what extent the scale of their presence is really unprecedented. Moreover, since the 1990s 
there has been much discussion in the literature of armed conflict on the perceived rise of 
„new wars” that are seen as distinct from the wars of old in certain respects (see e.g. 
Kaldor, 1999; Collier, 2000). The general assumptions operating behind this include the 
view that today’s wars are motivated „by greed rather than grievance,” that combatants 
lack ideology and mass legitimacy, and that they are inclined to use uninhibited violence 
even gratuitously (as this is summed up by a source critical of the discourse of new wars: 
Kalyvas, 2001). 
The new war thesis, were we to believe it, would present a puzzle: If wars are 
really unlimited by considerations of morality or legitimacy, and are free of ideology, 
then in today’s globalised world, characterised by a larger and more intense flow of 
persons than before, we should expect mass foreign combatant involvement in purely 
financially motivated, resource-exploitative fighting. Perhaps especially so in conflicts in 
sub-Saharan Africa that are often seen or presented as archetypes of new war.  
In fact, sellswords and freelancers (along with other military professionals for 
hire, such as mercenary archers, crossbowmen, siege engineers, etc.) were more common 
in medieval Europe than in the conflicts in question in the present day, as the example of 
the condottieri,12 free companies, routiers,13 and others may show. In contrast, at the 
present the involvement of ideologically motivated foreign combatants is on the rise with 
the ascendance, among others, of the transnational jihadi movement since the 1970s. 
The explanation for this on a superficial level may be two-fold, and lie partly in 
less than complete transnationalisation on the one hand, and the (in fact) less than 
complete transformation of the character of war on the other. To elaborate further: (1) it 
may matter to a combatant if one’s home state and/or society (or at least a relevant 
                                                          
infrastructure as well – according to Hindley „by AD 350 there was a regular pilgrim route from Bordeaux 
to Jerusalem with hospices on the way” (2004: 3). 
12 Machiavelli thus writes of the condottieri: „Mercenaries are disorganised, ambitious, undisciplined, and 
disloyal; bold among friends, among enemies cowardly (…) In peacetime they plunder you, in wartime 
your enemies do [because your mercenaries will flee instead of beating them back]” (Machiavelli, 2008: 
221). Elsewhere he writes of the demoralising effect that the employment of (and dependence on) foreign 
troops may have on one’s regular forces (p. 241). 
13 Routiers or roaming (and killing and plundering) unpaid sellswords played a role both in causing and, 
eventually, in putting down the peasant rebellion of 1358 in northern France (known as the La Grande 
Jacquerie in French) [Erdődy, 1969: 7-23]. Four years later some of the same free companies involved have 
banded together to defeat the French army at the battle of Brignais – one of their commanders was the 
English mercenary John Hawkwood (Caferro, 2006). 
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segment thereof) approves of involvement in combat in a foreign location in terms of 
dominant values, beliefs and views; (2) it may also matter from the perspective of hosts, 
in terms of efficiency in combat as well as considerations of legitimacy, if they are 
fighting together with comrades with whom they share (at the least) culture and language 
(or a political vision). 
Methodically verifying these propositions in empirical research may be warranted. 
Beyond addressing their validity, understanding the deeper reasons behind the 
contemporary character of civil war is prospectively even more interesting. Resource-
exploitative many a contemporary conflict may be, yet even as the resources in question 
are sucked out of the regions concerned and are utilised by a globally interconnected and 
interdependent economy, most of those involved in the fighting on the ground remain 
local to the broader conflict zone, helped in some cases by ideologically motivated and/or 
culturally related comrades-in-arms. 
 
Conclusion 
Foreign fighting and migration connect in ways that may be obvious – such as that foreign 
fighters are themselves a special subset of migrants. Yet, as this article has shown, other 
connections exist that may be interesting to uncover, as is for instance the link with state 
formation and the role played in it by combatants who chose to emigrate upon their 
involvement in foreign fighting. 
At the same time, it has also become visible in the process of exploring this 
connection that foreign combat and conflict interrelate in complex ways via population 
displacement. Viewed from this vantage point, the paradoxical nature of foreign fighting 
needs to be realised. Interpreting foreign combat as an anomalous form of migration, this 
article examined foreign combatants’ motives based on the available literature on 
migration and foreign fighters, as well as based on a broad set of empirical examples. 
Highlighting related considerations along with some of the practicalities (and 
difficulties) of foreign combat also points to a flawed aspect of new war theory that may 
guide further critical examination of its propositions: namely, that new war theory’s 
assumption of „greed” being the most important motive of contemporary combatants  
may be called into question in light of the continued importance of cultural factors and 
ideological motives for participation in foreign combat. 
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This underlines the need to take continuities in the nature of armed conflict 
seriously at a time when new (and seemingly new) aspects of conflict are often over-
emphasised.  
 
References 
Adamson, Fiona B. (2005): Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and 
Networks of Violence. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18:1, pp. 31-
49. 
ADL (2015): Al-Shabaab’s American Recruits. Anti-Defamation League, February 2015, 
at http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/al-shabaabs-american-
recruits.pdf (accessed: 5 January 2016). 
AP (2012): Bin Laden's cook freed from Guantanamo Bay after 10 years. AP, 11 July 
2012, at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bin-ladens-cook-freed-from-
guantanamo-bay-after-10-years/ (accessed: 7 January 2016). 
Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David (2001): The Advent of Netwar (Revisited). In: 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, eds.: Networks and Netwars The Future of Terror, Crime, 
and Militancy. Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND Corporation. 
Barabási Albert-László (2013): Behálózva: A hálózatok új tudománya. Budapest: 
Helikon. 
Caferro, William (2006): John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century 
Italy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Chudzio, Hubert – Hejczyk, Anna (2015): „For our freedom and yours”: Polish deportees 
in the ranks of the 2nd Polish Corps. Biztpol Affairs, 3:3, pp. 10-24. 
Ciluffo, Frank J. – Jeffrey B. Cozzens – Magnus Ranstorp (2010): Foreign Fighters: 
Trends, Trajectories and Conflict Zones. The Homeland Security Policy Institute 
at George Washington University, Washington, 1 October 2010. 
Cohen, Boaz (2011): The Jewish DP experience. In: Friedman, Jonathan C., ed.: The 
Routledge History of the Holocaust. New York: Routledge, pp. 412-422. 
Collier, Paul (2000): Rebellion as a Qasi-Criminal Activity. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 44:6, pp. 839-853. 
Dehghal, Saeed Kamali (2015): Afghan refugees in Iran being sent to fight and die for 
Assad in Syria. The Guardian, 5 November 2015, at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/05/iran-recruits-afghan-refugees-
fight-save-syrias-bashar-al-assad (accessed: 10 January 2016). 
P. MARTON  COJOURN 1:1 (2016) 
48 
 
della Porta, Donatella (1995): Social movements, political violence, and the state: A 
comparative analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge Studies in Comparative 
Politics (series), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Erdődy János (1969): Bocskorosok hadinépe. Budapest: Móra Ferenc Könyvkiadó. 
Farwell, Byron (1990): The Gurkhas. London: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Ferme, Mariane C. – Hoffman, Danny (2004): Hunter Militias and the International 
Human Rights Discourse in Sierra Leone and Beyond. Africa Today, 50:4, 
Summer 2004, pp. 73-95. 
Hegghammer, Thomas (2010): The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the 
Globalization of Jihad. International Security, Winter 2010/2011, 35:3, pp. 53-94. 
Hegghammer, Thomas (2013): Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in 
Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. American 
Political Science Review, February 2013, 107:1, pp. 1-15.  
Herlihy-Mera, Jeffrey (2012): „He was a sort of joke, in fact:” Ernest Hemingway in 
Spain. The Hemingway Review, Spring 2012, 31:2, pp. 84-100.  
Hindley, Geoffrey (2004): A Brief History of the Crusades: Islam and Christianity in the 
Struggle for World Supremacy. London: Constable & Robinson. 
Howe, Herbert M. (1998): Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of 
Executive Outcomes. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 36:2 (Jun., 1998), 
pp. 307-331. 
Human Rights Watch (2001): Afghanistan – Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, 
Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War. Available at 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm (accessed: 8 
January 2016). 
Kaldor, Mary (1999): New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2001): „New” and „Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? World 
Politics, 54:1, pp. 99-118. 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006): The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge Studies in 
Comparative Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink (1999): Transnational advocacy networks in 
international and regional politics. International Social Science Journal, LI.:159, 
UNESCO, pp. 89-101. 
P. MARTON  COJOURN 1:1 (2016) 
49 
 
Koser, Khalid (2007): International Migration: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Koskodan, Kenneth K. (2011): No Greater Ally: The Untold Story of Poland's Forces in 
World War II. London: Osprey. 
Kramer, Andrew A. (2015): Islamic Battalions, Stocked With Chechens, Aid Ukraine in 
War With Rebels. The New York Times, 7 July 2015, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/world/europe/islamic-battalions-stocked-
with-chechens-aid-ukraine-in-war-with-rebels.html?_r=2 (accessed: 3 January 
2016). 
Lischer, Sarah Kenyon (2007): Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced 
Displacement. Civil Wars, 9:2 (June 2007), pp. 142–155. 
Lloyd, Catherine (1999a): Transnational mobilisations in contexts of violent conflict: the 
case of solidarity with women in Algeria. Contemporary Politics, 5:4, pp. 365-
377. 
Lloyd, Simon (1999b): The Crusading Movement, 1096-1274. In: Riley-Smith, Jonathan, 
ed.: The Oxford History of the Crusades. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
35-67. 
Machiavelli, Niccolò (2008): The Prince. Translated, with introduction and notes by 
James B. Atkinson. Indianapolis: Hackett [reprint of 1976 edition]. 
Malet, David (2013): Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Morillo, Stephen (2008): Mercenaries, Mamluks and Militia: Towards a Cross-Cultural 
Typology of Military Service. In: France, John, ed.: Mercenaries and Paid Men: 
The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages. Smithsonian History of Warfare 
(series), Leiden: Brill Publishers, pp. 243-260. 
Morris, Loveday (2016): Unhappy in Europe, some Iraqis return home. The Washington 
Post, 2 January 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/unhappy-in-europe-some-
iraqis-return-home/2015/12/30/cc1d106c-a33c-11e5-8318-
bd8caed8c588_story.html (accessed: 10 January 2016). 
Patin – bell¿ngcat (2015): The Other Foreign Fighters: An Open-Source Investigation 
into American Volunteers Fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. A 
bell¿ngcat Investigation, author: Nathan Patin, available at 
P. MARTON  COJOURN 1:1 (2016) 
50 
 
https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/The-Other-Foreign-
Fighters.pdf (accessed: 4 January 2016). 
PBS (2015): Inside Assad’s Syria. Documentary, July 2015, at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/inside-assads-syria/ (accessed: 9 January 
2016). 
Petersen, Roger D. (2001): Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. 
Studies in Rationality and Social Change (series), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Porch, Douglas (2010): The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the 
Legendary Fighting Force. London: Skyhorse. 
Rękawek, Kacper (2015a): Neither “NATO’s Foreign Legion” Nor the “Donbass 
International Brigades:” (Where Are All the)  Foreign Fighters in Ukraine? PISM 
Policy Paper no. 6 (108), at https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19434 (accessed: 
10 January 2016). 
Rękawek, Kacper (2015b): Review Article – „The Polite People:” Pro-Russian Fighters 
in the Donbass, a documentary by Kat Argo, 2015, self-released. Biztpol Affairs, 
3:3, pp. 25-34.  
Reese, Lee Fleming (1992): Hessians in the Revolutionary War. Education, 113:1, pp. 
16-18. 
Riley-Smith, Jonathan (2005): The Crusades: A History. London: Continuum. 
San, Marion van (2015): Lost Souls Searching for Answers? Belgian and Dutch Converts 
Joining the Islamic State. Perspectives on Terrorism, 9:5 (October 2015), pp. 47-
56. 
Stedman, Stephen John – Tanner, Fred (2003): Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and 
the Abuse of Human Suffering. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
Singer, P. W. (2003): Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry. 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Yablonka, Hanna [as Hannah Torok-Yablonka] (1992): The Recruitment of Holocaust 
Survivors During the War of Independence. Studies in Zionism, 13:1, pp. 43-56. 
Zertal, Idith (1998): From Catastrophe to Power: The Holocaust Survivors and the 
Emergence of Israel. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California. 
Zuijdewijn, Jeanine de Roy van (2014): Fearing the Western Muslim Foreign Fighter: 
The Connection Between Fighting the Defensive Jihad and Terrorist Activity in 
the West. MA thesis work, Universiteit Utrecht. 
